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THE LAW OF THE MARKET 
HANOCH DAGAN*, AVIHAY DORFMAN**, ROY KREITNER*** & DANIEL 
MARKOVITS**** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Much contemporary discussion of “the market” assumes that it has an 
immanent logic that leads inexorably to runaway inequality, an erosion of 
corporate accountability, and the commodification of education, health, politics, 
and other basic goods. However, markets arise out of and operate through law—
not just through public regulation but also through private law regimes (in 
property, contract, and tort) that create entitlements, enforce market exchanges, 
and limit expropriation. Appreciating the significance of law as the infrastructure 
of markets reveals that no particular market structure is inevitable. Instead, every 
market order is the result of a complex set of legal and political choices. 
This Issue of Law and Contemporary Problems investigates the legal 
foundations of market orders. In this Foreword, we rely upon the Articles that 
follow to offer an intellectual roadmap for a legally-informed study of the market. 
These rich and thought-provoking Articles underscore the fundamental role of 
law in the constitution of markets, as well as the options, limits, dangers, and 
responsibilities that the legal construction of markets entails. 
One lesson that we take from these writings is that the market can be thought 
of as a thick ethical concept that can be understood only by combing facts and 
norms, which cannot be prised apart without doing damage to both. This means 
that different forms of the market in fact instantiate differing normative visions 
of the market. To flesh out and generalize these evaluative aspects, we conclude 
in Part VI with a sketch of three competing visions: efficient markets, democratic 
markets, and liberal markets. We acknowledge that real markets are imperfect 
instantiations, and at times hybrids, of these ideal-types. In addition, the types 
may be further divided, oftentimes with crucial distinctions among their rival 
variants. But for purposes of this Foreword, our goal is modest: we have no 
ambition to offer a complete taxonomy of market orders or to resolve the debate 
over the market’s normative foundations. We hope only to bring home our 
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conclusion that any adequate inquiry into the market must take this normative 
debate into account. 
 
II 
MARKETS AND LAW 
The markets that saturate modern life come in various forms: in goods and in 
services, domestic and transnational, off-line and on-line. Their pervasive 
presence produces two understandable but unfortunate effects on discourse, both 
public and academic. First, at times the discourse sounds as if markets are simply 
part of our natural environment, a brute given of the human condition, like our 
need for air to breathe. Second, even where no such naturalization takes hold, 
another form of reification often arises: a presupposition that “the market” 
necessarily follows one form that, at its core, possesses a given set of necessary 
and sufficient features. Both champions and critics tend to celebrate or criticize 
the market, implying that we all know what this means and that it necessarily 
means that one thing. 
The notion of “intervention in the market” vividly manifests both tendencies. 
Intervention may have both negative and positive connotations. So-called market 
fundamentalists typically emphasize the negative: they tend to perceive any rule 
or regulation intended to affect the existing operations of a given market as a 
priori suspect, either because it artificially meddles with the market’s operations 
or because it might distort the market’s natural, and by extension beneficial, 
tendencies. Market skeptics, on the other hand, apply an almost mirror-image 
presumption against markets, treating the market as a wild force against which 
we should guard. 
Because markets are powerful institutions that significantly impact 
individuals, affect relationships, and shape societies, their design should be 
carefully scrutinized. And because markets are the creation of human societies, 
and the shape of any market depends heavily on the legal rules that guide nearly 
every step in market actors’ behavior, this scrutiny must be particularized. 
Lawyers and legal scholars ought to be especially attentive to particulars in 
framing and evaluating these legal rules. A proposed new rule for the law of the 
market may be troublesome or it may be desirable, but the idea that any new rule 
intervenes (for better or for worse) in the market makes no sense. Instead, 
markets necessarily depend on well-designed and well-enforced rules of the 
game: they rely on, and are constituted by, a legal infrastructure. 
Markets, in other words, are at least in part legal constructs. And the law 
influences their construction. Evaluating the merits of any proposed legal reform 
in this space necessarily relies on particular normative conceptions of the good 
that markets, or the particular market in question, might supply. But the fact that 
a given rule or doctrine is (or is not, or is not yet) part of the law of the market 
does not make it more (or less) interventionist, because the existing rules of a 
given market do not epitomize the necessary configuration of the market. The 
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status quo, being itself a legal construct, cannot serve as a baseline against which 
to measure legal intervention. 
Markets are varied, and talking of the market counterproductively 
essentializes or reifies the status quo. But this should not be taken to suggest that 
analysis of markets’ principal features is a pointless exercise. While variations are 
crucial, markets typically revolve around certain basic features worth 
emphasizing. Markets are complicated “social and institutional arrangements 
through which goods [and services] are regularly produced for, distributed by and 
subject to contractual forms of exchange in which money and property rights over 
goods [or rights to services] are transferred between agents.”1 Markets are robust 
infrastructures that enable systemic, repeatable acts of exchange, and especially 
exchange among strangers. Smoothly functioning markets rely on defined and 
respected property rights and rest on the idea that contracts should be honored 
and, if necessary, enforced. Moreover, while some types of trade—ranging from 
primitive forms of barter to intricately developed gift exchange—are possible 
without markets, trading systems that become sufficiently widespread such that 
they reasonably establish market societies must rely on a common, acceptable, 
liquid currency—namely, money—to facilitate trade. 
Contract is the key mechanism for exchanging entitlements, and this makes 
contract central to markets, however conceived. Accordingly, many of the 
Articles in this Issue consider how the law of various contract types—involving, 
for example, commercial dealings, consumer goods, or employment 
relationships—plays a crucial role in the construction of commercial, consumer, 
and labor markets, respectively.2 Similarly, law can variously prescribe the scope 
and content of the property rights of owners over the means of production, which 
dramatically affects the contours of our labor markets.3 
Often, even cursory attention to law suffices to realize its indispensable work 
in the construction of the market (or, more precisely, of a given market, since 
different markets are differently designed). But at times law’s constructive role 
is more opaque, for two distinct reasons. First, the role of law may be such an 
entrenched aspect of background understandings that its arrangements seem 
axiomatic, or even conceptually necessary. Second, law’s work may be indirect. 
Its effect may be an offshoot, or an unintended consequence of a legal doctrine 
whose raison d’être actually lies elsewhere. Two of the Articles in this Issue offer 
telling examples. 
Christine Desan’s The Key to Value: The Debate over Commensurability in 
Neoclassical and Credit Approaches to Money4 highlights this first aspect of law’s 
 
 1.  JOHN O’NEILL, THE MARKET: ETHICS, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 4 (1998). 
 2.  See, e.g., Christine Desan, The Key to Value: The Debate over Commensurability in Neoclassical 
and Credit Approaches to Money, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 1; Robert E. Scott, The 
Paradox of Contracting in Markets, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 71; Kathleen Thelen, 
Employer Organization and the Law: American Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective, 83 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 23. 
 3.  See HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY ch. 7 (forthcoming 2020). 
 4.  Desan, supra note 2.  
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opacity by exposing law’s often obscured role at the most elemental level of 
constructing markets: creating the money that generates commensurable value 
that in turn facilitates ordered and preference-maximizing trade. On Desan’s 
account, market economies cannot get off the ground without money that makes 
otherwise random desires into ordered and comparable values. Money is thus the 
condition of possibility for the emergence of widespread markets. But money is 
not a project conducted in pure abstraction. Instead, the concrete legal 
arrangements that form money’s design inevitably push and pull people towards 
specific activities. A money system based on commercial banking privileges 
profit-making activity with relatively short time horizons. A system based solely 
on government-issued money would (and historically did) push towards different 
goals. Markets based on differently designed moneys do not simply facilitate pre-
existing preferences; they participate mightily in the very formation of values that 
people will pursue and through which they will understand themselves as 
individuals and as societies. 
Kathleen Thelen’s Employer Organization and the Law: American 
Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective5 highlights the second aspect of law’s 
opacity in our understanding of markets: how law’s indirect effects can become 
central for resulting market frameworks. Her comparison of Germany and the 
United States traces the collaborative relationship between labor unions and 
employers’ associations of small entrepreneurs. In both settings, small- and 
medium-sized manufacturers saw organized labor as a potential partner in 
protecting themselves against cutthroat competition from marginal producers. In 
Germany, trade associations succeeded in coordinating strategy and negotiating 
with unions. In the United States, however, the loosely coordinated legal activism 
of small proprietary capitalists undermined burgeoning coalitions between 
employer organizations and unions. That legal activism took the form of anti-
union litigation based on antitrust law, and it was successful enough to weed out 
the kinds of sectoral employer and trade organizations that survived in the 
European legal context. American antitrust law was born out of concerns about 
large concentrations of capital, but it was instead successfully directed against the 
unions. This shift in orientation pulled the rug out from under the cooperative 
frameworks developing between unions and employers. 
 
III 
ARCHITECTURE 
The notion of a legal construct does not imply that law’s architects can design 
the market in whatever shape they choose, as if writing on a blank slate. To be 
both legitimate and effective, law must face (respectively) justificatory and 
instrumental constraints. Consider first the instrumental constraints, which the 
architects of the law must recognize if they are to rise to the challenges of 
 
 5.  Thelen, supra note 2.  
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constructing successful markets. Both the constraints and the challenges derive 
from the same truism: law’s prescriptions are not self-executing. They are 
mediated by legal institutions, and their effects depend on the responses both of 
their addressees and of third parties who may be interested in the subject matter 
at hand. Appreciating the significance of these two dimensions is key to 
understanding the constraints and the challenges faced by the law of the market. 
The institutional dimension is particularly acute in the common law tradition, 
which strongly associates private law with adjudication. Court proceedings are 
sometimes perceived as an obvious home for the law of the market, since 
adjudication is designed to assess the parties’ behavior vis-à-vis their 
interpersonal rights and obligations as well as to refine the rules that delineate 
these rights and obligations to begin with. But in a complex and interconnected 
society, it is increasingly difficult to expect courts to be solely responsible for the 
provision of the infrastructure needed for a secure marketplace. This is a mission 
that often requires general legislation, and at times a full-blown administrative 
apparatus, to supplement or even supplant courts. The law of the market is 
therefore a product of a joint venture among legislatures, administrative 
agencies, and a host of quasi-public and even fully private organizations, all 
working alongside courts.6 
There is widespread agreement that regulation should attempt to address 
systemic market failures.7 When monopolies, externalities, or informational 
inadequacies are rampant, an “uncontrolled marketplace” will likely “fail to 
produce behavior or results in accordance with the public interest.”8 But often 
regulation is also useful—and sometimes indispensable—for another purpose: 
the articulation, development, and vindication of market actors’ interpersonal 
rights. It may be necessary for ensuring the generality of legal prescription, 
allowing people to adjust their behavior to conform to the rule of law, 
maintaining the required technological expertise for legal decision making, and 
establishing effective tools for proactive (as opposed to reactive) ex ante 
guarantees of people’s interpersonal rights.9 
 
 6.  Think of the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS), a not-for-profit 
corporation whose standards govern accounting in over 140 jurisdictions. About us, IFRS, 
https://www.ifrs.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/CFX2-ETPA]. Additional examples of “private” 
lawmaking, especially in the transnational sphere, could be multiplied with ease. For examples including 
banking, money laundering, insurance, and securities regulation, see generally DAVID ANDREW SINGER, 
REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2007); 
Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011); 
Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 20 (2011); David 
Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563 (2007). 
 7.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 55–63 (1990). 
 8.  ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: 
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 15 (2d ed. 2012); see id. at 15–22 (discussing market failure 
rationales for regulating markets). 
 9.  See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Other Half of Regulatory Theory, 52 CONN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
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Institutional considerations figure importantly in effective regulation. Those 
who design the law of the market should attend to the virtues, limitations, and 
possible pitfalls of the expected performances of the various institutions involved 
in regulating market life. Moreover, law—especially the law of the market—must 
also anticipate and consider the expected responses of the pertinent private 
actors. Well-informed and sophisticated parties are especially likely to take law’s 
prescriptions as incentives rather than norms. In other words, legally-informed 
actors—both law’s potential addressees and interested third parties—may act in 
ways that circumvent the law’s intended effects and thus possibly undermine its 
normative underpinnings. If the architects of the law of the market are interested 
in law’s expected consequences, they must take seriously its incentive effects and 
be particularly attentive to the concern of counterproductive legal prescriptions.10 
Consequently, designing the law of the market is a complex task. The 
designers must examine the likely responses and counter-responses of market 
actors in order to foresee the ultimate outcomes of the competing legal regimes. 
These complications are further exacerbated in a globalized environment, which 
is increasingly typified by international regulatory competition.11 At times, these 
complications might frustratingly suggest that certain objectives or normative 
commitments are elusive. More often, they imply that achieving a normative goal 
is not as straightforward as it may seem; that choices must be made among 
competing imperfect alternatives, each of which must be carefully designed and 
institutionalized. 
Kim Oosterlinck, Joseph Blocher, and Mitu Gulati’s Article, Why Did 
Belgium Pay Leopold’s Bonds?,12 draws on Belgian King Leopold II’s reign over 
the Congo Free State (CFS) to study the interactions among market forces and 
legal doctrines that might police illicit conduct. King Leopold II, effectively the 
private owner of the CFS, relied heavily on issuing bond obligations to establish, 
run, and brutally exploit his private colony. Sovereign borrowing markets could 
have reacted to his horrific abuse of his Congolese subjects in at least two ways. 
First, the markets could have raised the costs of the loans issued by Leopold II 
on behalf of the CFS. Second, Belgium, the successor government to this despot, 
could have repudiated King Leopold II’s debt by invoking the doctrine of odious 
debts. The two reactions are intimately related as the former might follow from 
the possible occurrence of the latter. Hence, the legal doctrine of odious debts 
may put economic, not merely moral, pressure on the market standing of a 
malevolent despot. 
However, the authors find no evidence of any market penalty on the debt that 
funded Leopold’s wicked rule. Nor did Belgium invoke the odious debts doctrine 
 
 10.  See generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution 
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991). 
 11.  See, e.g., Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of 
Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 52 (2016); Tsilly Dagan, The Global 
Market for Tax and Legal Rules, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 148 (2017). 
 12.  83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 49. 
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upon purchasing the CFS from Leopold; instead, it accepted responsibility for his 
debts and paid them. What makes these outcomes possible is the legal design of 
the securities markets on which the debt traded. In particular, presenting the 
doctrine of odious debts as an option held by the successor government opens 
the way for lenders to base their borrowing decisions on financial, rather than 
moral, reasons. As a result, the otherwise important distinction between sinful 
and virtuous bonds becomes optional as well. 
Robert Scott’s Article, The Paradox of Contracting in Markets,13 in turn, 
demonstrates both the challenge of setting up the rules of the law of the market 
so that they properly serve a desired normative goal (in Scott’s case, efficiency) 
and the institutional dimension that must accompany such inquiries. Efficiency, 
he claims, implies two quite different objectives: improving contractual incentives 
that motivate parties to invest and trade; and economizing on the production 
costs of contracts by facilitating the parties’ abilities to realize the scale 
advantages of standardization. The difficulty is that these two objectives conflict. 
Standardization and economies of scale, which are key to the efficient production 
of contracts, tend to undermine the efficiency of contractual incentives. And 
bespoke efforts to motivate efficient investment and trade generate a loss of scale 
and thus inefficient production of contracts. 
Drawing on the way contracting parties in thick, multilateral markets 
optimize between these two conflicting effects, Scott claims that the key to 
efficiency lies in creating a functioning network of effective coordination, which 
can overcome the collective action problem that entrenches inefficiencies and is 
endemic to the process of producing contracts in thick markets. This solution, 
however, is unavailable in multilateral consumer markets. But it can be, and to 
some extent has been, substituted with a regulatory structure that can coordinate 
efforts to produce more efficient consumer contracts, thus avoiding the existing 
pricing errors that end up as rents that producers currently capture. 
 
IV 
DANGERS 
Some observers believe that central planning does not present a viable 
alternative for organizing large-scale economies, which means that the market 
economy is the only game in town.14 Others, of course, disagree.15 But even if, or 
 
 13.  Scott, supra note 2.  
 14.  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 48 (2018). 
 15.  The government of Cuba, for example, instituted a planned economy following the 1959 
Revolution and continues to plan much of the island’s economic activity even today. See generally 
JONATHAN C. BROWN, CUBA’S REVOLUTIONARY WORLD (2017). 
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maybe especially if, the former view is correct, it is important to identify the 
immanent risks that market modes of organization typically raise.16 
Market essentialists view this inquiry as the battlefield over whether market 
ordering is acceptable at all (either generally, or in one specific realm of activity). 
In certain contexts, this may be the right question to ask. But most cases do not 
raise the dramatic binary choice of either market or no market. Instead, 
appreciating a risk that a market structure might bring about in a certain setting 
may help to refine the law that governs that setting. Or, there may be a way to at 
least ameliorate the risk by deploying countervailing legal devices. Even risks 
that cannot be eradicated without sacrificing the advantages of market structures 
can generally be managed. While such managing measures should not make 
market designers complacent, the possibility of addressing the pertinent pitfalls 
invites a more refined analysis, which may yield better results than a binary 
decision. 
In this Foreword, we inevitably draw an abstract and imprecise picture. 
Nonetheless, it seems safe to state that the two main hazards that the market is 
said to produce are maldistribution and the commodification of human affairs. 
Both concerns are significant, and neither can be fully eliminated. And yet—at 
least in certain settings—recognizing them as potential pathologies may indeed 
help to identify acceptable legal responses. 
Consider first the distributive injustices that markets produce. The market’s 
currency of willingness to pay depends not only upon people’s preferences, but 
also upon their ability to pay. In certain contexts, this truism is largely 
inconsequential, since the pertinent parties’ ability to pay is roughly equal (or 
equal enough). But in other contexts, markets “systematically tend to distribute 
legal entitlements to the rich, exacerbating inequality.”17 For reasons of political 
economy, a subset of these unfortunate distributional consequences are likely to 
be rather sticky.18 Regressive consequences threaten to defy any plausible 
normative foundation of the law of the market. Therefore, friends of the market 
must not perceive these regressive consequences as part of the market’s appeal, 
but rather as unfortunate pathological effects that ought to be mitigated where 
possible.19 
Addressing distributive distortions through the law of the market is a tricky 
challenge, especially given the expected responses of legally-informed actors, 
noted above in Part III. This means that oftentimes properly confronting this 
 
 16.  We deliberately use here the term “immanent.” The idea that we can fix the bugs of a certain 
contingent market structure by adopting one that better responds to the market’s legitimate normative 
underpinnings is already implicit, of course, in the previous Parts. 
 17.  Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1703 (2018). 
 18.  Id. at 1703–04. 
 19.  At least with regard to some accounts of the ideal market, a similar analysis should apply to luck, 
which for Frank Knight is the most important feature of the market. See Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of 
Competition, 37 Q.J. ECON. 579, 609 (1923) (“The luck element moreover is so large—far larger than 
fairly successful participants in the game will ever admit—that capacity and effort may count for 
nothing.”). 
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challenge requires a broader toolkit, including a background public regime of tax 
and redistribution.20 The recursive nature of the game between lawmakers and 
the addressees of their prescriptions, as well as the political economy of tax and 
welfare legislation, imply, however, that this route is no panacea. 
A similar analysis applies to the concern of commodification of people and 
their interpersonal relationships. This concern arises most forcefully when 
market mechanisms are introduced into a realm of life previously outside the 
sphere of commodities. Commodifying personal relations, such as friendship or 
romance, or practices with independent logics of value, such as art, sports, or 
politics, into the thin monetary terms that typify the market is troublesome, on 
this view. Commodification threatens to undermine these independent norms 
and to flatten or even efface worthy aspects of a world characterized by plural 
normative systems.21 The gravity of this risk of commodification and its scope of 
application are disputed.22 For our purposes it is enough to observe that, as with 
the concern that markets can be regressive, the risk of devastating 
commodification need not imply wholesale rejection of market mechanisms. The 
law of the market can employ techniques of incomplete commodification, which 
aim at ensuring that, while entitlements are exchanged, interactions retain their 
personal aspect or their non-commodity logic of relations.23 
These risks of market formations are more or less familiar. Two of the 
Articles in this Issue raise another risk, one that may be conceptually different, 
in the sense that it might not be similarly ameliorated. In their Articles, both 
Katharina Pistor and Przemysław Pałka focus on some of the implications of the 
recent rise of online markets, highlighting the danger that these developments 
might cause the market to undermine itself. What might seem at first glance to 
be a perfection of market logic, they warn us, might end up as a market façade 
that is in essence a new form of social planning. 
Katharina Pistor’s Article, Rule by Data: The End of Markets?,24 considers 
the possible implications of technology—the rise of big data and artificial 
 
 20.  We use the conventional term, “redistribution,” but must note that it is—at least here—patently 
misleading, given that the task is to remedy the distortions that the market’s regressive distribution may 
yield. 
 21.  One need not develop a deep commitment to plural normative systems to appreciate the simple 
point we advance here. Even in activities organized by high stakes markets, like professional sports, it 
would strike any fan as scandalous if an MVP award was simply handed to the player with the highest 
salary (because of the salary itself, as a sole indication of what it meant to be “the most valuable player”). 
The example might seem frivolous, but it serves to highlight the fact that market and non-market logic 
are likely to live side-by-side within many of our everyday practices. The “danger” is usually a question 
of a contest between logics and the moments of line-crossing. For the basic argument about plural orders 
of valuation, see generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). 
 22.  Compare Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), with Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 
(1987). 
 23.  See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141–67 (1993); 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 102–14 (1996) (discussing incomplete 
commodification). 
 24.  83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 101. 
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intelligence, in particular—for the competition between two forms of economic 
ordering: market versus hierarchical orderings. Traditionally, this competition is 
explained by reference to transaction costs.25 At some point on the transaction 
cost scale, it is more efficient to organize economic activities hierarchically (for 
example, by creating a firm) than by way of free and open exchange on the 
market. Pistor argues that technological transformations might make hierarchical 
orderings more efficient than market orderings even when transaction costs are 
rather trivial. Instead of engaging in a bargained-for exchange of goods, 
consumers would be provided with the goods that best satisfy their bargain-
independent preferences. Pistor further worries that economies of scale might 
make it more beneficial for mega internet firms (or Big Tech) to control the 
information necessary to run this hierarchy-based economic order. This end-of-
markets script is regrettable, Pistor argues, because it undermines the egalitarian 
foundations of market exchange and subjects people to domination by powerful, 
private entities. Her solution considers two possible legal avenues. The first 
builds on property law. Pistor believes that data should have been made res 
communis in the first place. But since lawmakers have failed to do so, she 
identifies an alternative avenue—business organization law—as a source of 
recognizing consumers as holders of collective rights in data. This remedy may 
not bring back market orderings, but it could provide a substantial antidote to 
consumer domination by Big Tech’s data. 
Przemysław Pałka’s Algorithmic Central Planning: Between Efficiency and 
Freedom26 also wonders whether big data and algorithmic processing might lead 
market mechanisms to undermine the practices of individual choice on which 
conventional market logics depend. By making individual preferences 
computable, these technological innovations promise—or threaten—to build an 
effectively-planned economy through the incremental empowering of private 
central planners rather than through the revolutionary creation of a centrally 
planning state. Pałka proposes that soon, if not already today, companies such as 
Google, Facebook, and Amazon will know more about individual people’s 
preferences than will the individuals themselves, and these firms’ algorithms will 
be able to satisfy people’s preferences more accurately, and at lower transaction 
costs, than the people’s own choices. This produces a powerful pressure to 
displace the individual market transactions that presently organize production 
and consumption with decision-by-algorithm, which is just central planning by 
another name. Pałka worries both about the processes that will yield this 
transformation, and about the eventual outcome. Will we choose, with collective 
or even individual deliberation, to cede our market choices to algorithmic 
planning? And even if algorithms actually do better satisfy our preferences than 
our own market choices could, is an algorithmically-planned economy desirable? 
Or, alternatively, is the act of choosing valuable apart from its results, so that 
choice is not a transaction cost but rather, as one might say, a transaction benefit? 
 
 25.  See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 26.  83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 125. 
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V 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Some discussions of the market obscure another important proposition. 
Market forces—the actions of buyers and sellers that affect the availability and 
price of goods and services—are sometimes presented as or assumed to be either 
prior to law or beyond law’s responsibility. This presupposition is the flipside of 
the conventional use of government intervention noted above.27 In this view, law 
can, for better or for worse, only respond to—control, influence, affect—market 
forces. But it cannot be held responsible for these powers in and of themselves. 
If what we have said thus far is correct, the conventional view is partial and 
misleading. The market is an artifact shaped by humans and can be variously 
designed. Describing the conventional view as artificial is not a condemnation. 
After all, most of the important aspects of our social life are human-made. Just 
like the study of other valuable human-made institutions, a clear-headed 
understanding and analysis of markets should be careful not to essentialize the 
current instantiation of the market, as if it were completely beyond human 
control. 
Richard Brooks’s Article, Black Markets and the Exchange Structure,28 
challenges the central role that we give law in constructing markets while aspiring 
to avoid the naturalism and essentialism about markets that we reject. Brooks 
proposes that every society has an “exchange structure”—a set of norms and 
practices that governs transactions among the society’s members with an eye to 
preserving respect for its own rules. The exchange structure, for Brooks, precedes 
the state and its laws, and law enters the scene to stabilize and validate this 
structure. Critically, Brooks insists, the problems of legitimacy and stability never 
get a conclusive resolution—the need to preserve the exchange structure against 
decay never subsides. Moreover, Brooks observes, a zero-tolerance policy 
towards deviants rarely, if ever, best promotes stability. Instead, exchange 
structures must find ways to de-fang violations of their rules—to cabin 
deviations—in a manner that supports the survival of the very rules and systems 
that the deviants challenge. They must, Brooks says, evolve “various strategies 
allowing transgression while limiting [transgression’s] follow-on consequences” 
in order to maintain the structure’s durability.29 Black markets, for Brooks, serve 
precisely this role. And a study of their normative structure—their mix of express 
prohibitions and implicit permissions—reveals something deep about the role of 
the law in sustaining, and giving a normative frame to, markets generally. 
The power of the law is not limitless. As we’ve seen, the law of the market 
faces constraints. To begin with, for markets to exist as realms of voluntary 
transactions, there must be limits on legal coercion in and around market 
activities. That said, because it is law that sets up the rules of the game—the 
 
 27.  See supra Part II. 
 28.  83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 151. 
 29.  Id. at 171. 
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contours of people’s Hohfeldian powers as owners and promisees, as well as their 
access to money—law necessarily engages in market-making. Therefore, even 
where its workings should be somewhat constrained, the law cannot be 
completely detached from responsibility for the transactions it both authorizes 
and enforces, and from the societal results of that transactional world.30 
Avihay Dorfman’s Article, The Limited Case for Discrimination’s Legality,31 
considers non-contingent constraints on the legal enforcement of 
antidiscrimination duties. He asks what principled concerns might justify 
relieving market actors of the proscriptions of antidiscrimination law. Although 
there may be any number of epistemic and instrumental hurdles to calling the 
moral duty against discrimination into law, Dorfman argues for a substantive 
concern, namely, free agency. On this concern, a liberal law of the market must 
treat private persons, including those who act from discriminatory motivation, as 
free and equal agents. Doing so requires recognizing that such persons are 
entitled to change their minds by revising their discriminatory motivations and 
acting in conformity with the demands of right reason (narrowly defined to 
exclude clear instances of bigotry). Dorfman distinguishes between an outward 
act of refusing to deal with another and its underlying illicit motivation. He then 
argues that holding a bigot legally responsible for acquiring morally unacceptable 
motives while executing a perfectly legitimate act undermines the bigot’s free 
agency. The explanation is that the law denies him or her the opportunity to act, 
including by repeating the refusal to deal with another, on the basis of morally 
sound motives by revising the current one. 
More generally, the law of the market, both when it coerces and when it 
authorizes, has profound implications for people’s lives. Therefore, for the law of 
the market to be legitimate, let alone just, it should be designed in a way that is 
both attentive to the dangers and the limitations we’ve discussed and normatively 
acceptable.32 
Recognizing the role of law in shaping markets drives a better understanding 
of their plasticity and thus helps clarify thinking about how markets might be 
designed. That has been our primary task, but clarity engenders an additional 
task. When we recognize the law’s role in designing markets and appreciate the 
 
 30.  The idea of responsibility we use here may strike the reader as a bit unorthodox (it is certainly 
quite far from the idea of responsibility in say, torts or criminal law). What we have in mind is that 
designing the law of the market should take into account the expected results of the adopted design. The 
fact that system design does not ensure particular results with known individuals as winners and losers 
does not absolve the designer from the task of considering overall effects (just as the designers of 
highways must take into account actual driving without knowing who in particular will need to use the 
road-shoulder). We do not intend by this to collapse into one another different levels of responsibility, 
for instance those of particular actors and those of system designers. 
 31.  83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 175. 
 32.  This requirement of justifiability is shared not only by natural lawyers, but also by positivists, 
who acknowledge that law’s claim to authority implies (as Joseph Raz put it) that “it is essential to the 
law that it recognizes that its use of power is answerable to moral standards and claims to have reconciled 
power and morality.” JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY 
OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 1 (2009). 
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range of choices open to the architects of the law of the market, we must then ask 
about the normative underpinnings of markets. These architects should evaluate 
existing market formations and either reject, reform, or perhaps embrace them—
but the evaluations must not, and cannot possibly, rest on a merely technical 
account of what makes a market. Instead, they should realize that different 
market designs have different normative implications. Indeed, recognizing the 
crucial role of law in the construction of markets and appreciating that markets 
are complex phenomena with heterogeneous manifestations does not, and should 
not, dissipate controversies. Quite the contrary: it highlights the significance of 
the competing normative ideals for which the market can stand. 
 
VI 
NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 
The Articles in this Issue highlight the options, limits, dangers, and 
responsibilities that the legal construction of markets entails. These are all 
necessary aspects of a legally-informed study of the market. But they are still not 
sufficient. The market, as noted, is a thick ethical concept, which means that such 
a study necessarily implicates an analysis of the various normative ideals markets 
can serve. We thus conclude with a brief outline of three normative market ideals: 
efficient markets, democratic markets, and liberal markets. 
Efficient markets are designed so as to maximize economic output. An 
approach to markets that emphasizes efficiency thus takes an essentially 
allocative view of markets. It evaluates market orderings neither in light of the 
relations that they underwrite among traders nor in terms of the relations that 
they produce between traders and the state, but rather according to the ways in 
which markets distribute goods in service of investment, production, and, 
ultimately, consumption. 
Efficiency-based approaches therefore treat markets instrumentally, as 
technologies for producing outcomes that are assessed as desirable (or not) 
without making any essential reference to their having been produced by means 
of market exchanges. Typically, these approaches assess market outcomes using 
the technical language of efficiency developed by economists. This includes, for 
example, the Kaldor-Hicks conception that dominates both the law and 
economics of contract, property, and torts and the cost-benefit analysis deployed 
in administrative law and the study of regulation. This is why we use the term 
“efficient markets.” But the basic structure of these approaches does not require 
that they evaluate outcomes using precisely this metric. All that is essential is that 
they view markets as a means to an end. That end might be utilitarian (the 
greatest good for the greatest number) or even egalitarian (on any one of many 
conceptions of equality). The core of the view lies in the maximizing, not the 
maximand. 
Democratic markets have a very different ideal in mind. Markets are sites for 
exchanging entitlements over resources. Often, an idealized image of the market 
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presents that exchange as if it could completely circumvent disagreements and 
disputes about the underlying reasons people have for valuing certain resources 
or activities above others. The shorthand for that idealization is that the market 
is a place where the buyer votes with her dollars, and nobody questions why she 
values one product over another. This shorthand describes some markets quite 
well. Its underlying normative vision—according to which depersonalized and 
apolitical markets allow for cooperative behavior among people otherwise 
potentially disposed to conflict—certainly has its attractions. But it may sell short 
the potential markets hold for advancing active participation in the value 
conflicts that govern our lives. 
Control over resources implies authority over others, so if markets are the 
locus of transacting for entitlements to control, then they are intertwined 
inevitably with authority relations. The design of markets thus necessarily raises 
questions as to how authority should be allocated, what kinds of authority 
relationships are acceptable, and what society should demand of authority 
relations, particularly among strangers. Given the plasticity of markets outlined 
above, it seems plausible that the law could contribute to market formations with 
a range of authority relations vis-à-vis various resources. We could imagine 
authority heavily concentrated, or widely dispersed. We could imagine it 
protected by substantive and procedural barriers, or porous and open to 
contestation. Perhaps most concretely, we can imagine authority as established 
in a sense that closes off disagreement about underlying value, or alternatively as 
open to challenge precisely on that ground. 
Contestation over underlying values need not obviate the market; in certain 
cases, it might give participation in a market its full meaning. When market 
participants articulate the contestation over values, they highlight the activity as 
a social arrangement, as a set of relationships among people, rather than mere 
exchange of inert objects. If conditions are right (for example, if the law of the 
market makes it possible), market participants can call into question the given-
ness of relations that currently govern work and property ownership, breaking 
down reification. In the best-case scenario, market participants use their market 
voice to animate their moral and political lives, to assert self-government in 
contexts crucial for their well-being and flourishing. 
Four of the Articles in this Issue put questions of democratic participation in 
markets into focus. Desan’s Key to Value: The Debate over Commensurability in 
Neoclassical and Credit Approaches to Money33 reminds us that the model of 
money creation dominated by an independent central bank in cooperation with 
commercial banks is geared toward a limitation of democratic input. Pistor’s Rule 
by Data34 shows how tech giants have succeeded (so far) in limiting active 
participation by end users regarding authority over the data mined from their 
online activity. Pałka’s Algorithmic Central Planning35 worries that individual acts 
 
 33.  See generally Desan, supra note 2.  
 34.  See generally Pistor, supra note 24. 
 35.  See generally Pałka, supra note 26. 
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could cumulate to produce a planned economy without any collective decision. 
And Thelen’s Employer Organization and the Law: American Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective36 shows how well-targeted legal activism managed to 
thwart organizational attempts in one legal context, while similar ventures 
succeeded in another. Each of these Articles might be generalized thus: one of 
the features at stake in the design of markets is the allocation of authority. There 
are ways to allocate that authority that encourage continued participation in the 
contestation over underlying values, and ways to limit such participation. 
We denote the third market ideal-type a liberal market since it grounds 
markets in the moral quality of individual traders rather than in collective 
benefits. Once again, a range of views all embrace this liberal frame, even as they 
fill in its details very differently. Three views in particular bear mentioning here. 
First, and on the right side of the liberal spectrum, libertarian views 
emphasize the role that markets play in securing individual freedom. Some (in 
our minds less plausible) varieties of libertarianism about markets flirt with a 
naturalized account of property entitlements and even the basic rules of contract. 
These views propose that markets respect liberty against this naturalized 
backdrop, by protecting people against involuntary expropriation or enforced 
exchange. Other varieties of libertarianism (perhaps most profoundly, Hayek’s) 
emphasize both the informational and the normative problems that confront 
alternatives to market-based ways of organizing economic life.37 Planning, in 
particular, requires enormous quantities of information concerning both 
preferences and capabilities. And even if the purely fact-based informational 
problems confronting planning can be solved (perhaps through developments in 
algorithmic data processing), planners still face daunting evaluative and 
normative challenges. People value different things for different reasons, and 
planners cannot do their jobs without deciding which values are true and 
authoritative. But when planners make such evaluative judgments, they 
wrongfully usurp the proper independence and offend against the dignity of the 
people whose lives they plan. This is a subtle defense of markets, and far from 
the market fundamentalism that the other sort of libertarianism invites. In 
particular, the wrong of planning is tied to the central, authoritative declaration 
of what is valuable. Therefore, not every state intervention in economic life 
commits this wrong. That is why Hayek, who abhorred planning, did not object 
to regulation, especially where regulation serves to promote widespread 
participation in market life or to prevent private forms of domination from 
arising.38 
The problem of disagreement about value that exercises some libertarians 
also underwrites the second, left-leaning, egalitarian variant of liberal approaches 
 
 36.  See generally Thelen, supra note 2. 
 37.  See generally F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (Univ. of Chi. Press 2011) (1960) 
[hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY]; F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (Univ. of Chi. 
Press 2007) (1944). 
 38.  See THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 37, at 193–210. 
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to markets. When people value different things for different reasons, economic 
and social coordination depend on establishing a shared language of value that 
people can deploy for purposes of their commercial lives. Market prices establish 
this language of value. The price of a good (at least in an idealized pure exchange 
economy) equals what everyone else must give up for its owner to possess it, as 
measured by a formally equal amalgam of all of their preferences. This thought 
leads some left-liberals (perhaps most notably, Ronald Dworkin) to insist that, 
far from being forces against equality, markets are essential for economic 
equality to be intelligible at all.39 Without prices and the commensuration of value 
that they make possible, it is impossible to know who has how much. It is 
therefore also impossible to say who has more, and who has less, than justice 
requires. One of us has gone even farther, to argue that the normative structure 
of market exchange, and in particular the authority relations produced by the 
contracts through which market exchange occurs, establishes a form of valuable 
market solidarity that stands beside the political solidarity produced by 
democratic politics in the liberal states in which markets typically thrive.40 Of 
course, this approach faces challenges just like any other, perhaps most notably 
the challenge that fiat money’s connection to politics and the state (not least 
through modern central banking) deprives prices of the egalitarian quality and 
commensurate power on which equality of resources or market solidarity 
depend.41 Here, a great deal will turn on whether some version of Hayek’s 
distinction between regulation and planning may be introduced into left-liberal 
theory, to renovate prices in the face of the challenge posed by money’s political 
nature. 
Finally, the third variation of liberal markets relies on individual autonomy, 
rather than independence. It thus begins with the proposition that for people to 
lead the fully human life they are entitled to, law must be committed to enhancing 
their self-determination (or self-authorship).42 Markets are potentially conducive 
to people’s self-determination because they allow individuals the mobility 
necessary for self-determination, and since they expand the options available to 
individuals to function as the authors of their own lives. 
Markets, more specifically, enable the liquidation of existing holdings and 
thus facilitate people’s right to exit: to withdraw or refuse to further engage, to 
dissociate, to cut themselves out of a relationship with other persons. Exit, in turn, 
is crucial to autonomy because open boundaries enable geographical, social, 
familial, professional, and political mobility, which are prerequisites for a self-
directed life. Markets further extend this autonomy-enhancing function by 
 
 39.  See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 283 (1981). 
 40.  See Daniel Markovits, Market Solidarity, Inaugural Lecture as Guido Calabresi Professor of 
Law at Yale Law School (Apr. 9, 2012). 
 41.  This challenge is developed in Christine Desan’s contribution to this Issue, supra note 2. 
 42.  The remainder of this Part summarizes Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and 
The Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1289 (2019); Hanoch Dagan, Markets for Self-Authorship, 28 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577 (2018). 
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broadening the scope of choices between differing projects and ways of life. By 
facilitating people’s ability to legitimately enlist one another in the pursuit of 
private goals and purposes and creating a structure that multiplies the 
alternatives people can choose from, markets enable the individual to act—on 
her own or with the cooperation of others—upon her own goals, values, 
objectives, and her plan of life, without subordination to any other individual or 
subjection to any collective decision making procedure. 
Markets with the primary goal of autonomy enhancement will have several 
characteristics. Autonomy-enhancing markets must allow universal participation 
since exclusion and discrimination would undermine their raison d’être. They 
should also set limits on the power to alienate whenever it erodes our ability to 
rewrite our life stories and start anew. Such markets should proactively ensure 
meaningful choices in each major sphere of human action and interaction. 
However, this injunction of intra-sphere multiplicity must be curtailed where 
cognitive, behavioral, structural, and political economy reasons imply that more 
choice may actually reduce autonomy.43 Moreover, when markets are structured 
to serve autonomy, market relationships are governed by rules that require 
reciprocal respect for self-determination, meaning that party interactions in the 
market are governed by the maxim of relational justice.44 Furthermore, since 
utility is understood to be instrumental to the markets’ ultimate value—
autonomy—the law of the market must avoid the commodification of people and 
interpersonal relationships. It should thus employ, in some subsets of the settings 
it governs, the techniques of incomplete commodification, noted earlier, which 
ensure that these market interactions retain a personal aspect.45 
Finally, an autonomy-based law of the market must be particularly careful not 
to marginalize the broader picture, in which the justice of the market is partially 
dependent upon a background regime that guarantees the conditions of 
individual self-determination. Rather than striving to exclusivity, the law of the 
market, in this view, is attuned to its distinct autonomy-enhancing tasks of 
enabling mobility and expanding choice, while acknowledging the indispensable 
role of other social institutions in enabling these vital functions. 
 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Every market order is the result of a complex set of legal and political choices. 
This Foreword has offered an intellectual roadmap for a legally informed study 
of the market. Drawing on the insight that markets are plural and open to 
 
 43.  For the prescription of intra-sphere multiplicity, see HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, 
THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 67–134 (2017). 
 44.  See generally Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 
(2016); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for Contracts (Aug. 11, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435781 [https://perma.cc/9Q3S-RU2X]. 
 45.  See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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variable design, it reflects on both the options and constraints faced by law’s 
architects. It discusses certain familiar and less familiar risks in market design. In 
order to understand the risks and rewards of market orderings and to take on the 
responsibility of market design, this Foreword identifies three ideal-typical 
visions of markets—efficient, democratic, and liberal—and summarizes the 
values that these ideal-types deploy to address these challenges. 
 
